Abstract. We present a method for the security analysis of realistic models over off-the-shelf systems and their configuration by formal, machine-checked proofs. The presentation follows a large case study based on a formal security analysis of a CVS-Server architecture.
Introduction
These days, the Concurrent Versions System (CVS) is a widely used tool for version management in many industrial software development projects and plays a key role in open source projects usually carried out by highly distributed teams [3, 4] . (See http://www.cvshome.org.) CVS provides a central database (the repository) and means to synchronize local modifications of partial copies (the working copies) with the repository. The repository can be accessed via a network; this requires a security architecture establishing authentication, access control, and nonrepudiation. A further complication of the CVS security architecture stems from the fact that the administration of authentication and access control is done via CVS itself, i.e., the authentication table is accessed and modified via standard CVS operations.
This work emerged from our own experiences with setting up a CVS-Server for more than 80 users worldwide. Besides overcoming a number of security problems (see, e.g., http://www.cvshome.org/dev/security9706. html), we had to develop an improved CVS-Server configuration described in [1] meeting two system design requirements: first, we had to provide a configuration of a CVS-Server that enforces a role-based access control [13] ; second, we had to develop an "open CVS-Server architecture," where the repository is part of the shared filesystem of a local network and the server is a regular process on a machine in this network. While such an architecture has a number of advantages, the correctness and trustworthiness of the security mechanisms become a major concern. Thus, we decided to apply formal modeling and analysis techniques to meet the challenge.
In this paper, we present the method we developed for analyzing the security problems of complex systems such as the CVS-Server and its configuration. As a result, we provide the following contributions:
1. A modeling technique that we call architectural modeling, which has an abstraction level in between the usual behavioral modeling used in protocol analysis and code verification; 2. A technique to use system architecture models for defining security requirements; 3. The presentation of the mapping from security requirements to concrete security technologies as a datarefinement problem;
4. Mechanized proof techniques for refinements and security properties over system transitions; and 5. Reusable models for widely used security technologies. In particular, we provide means to model a certain type of security policies and show how security analysis can be performed not only on the abstract but also on the concrete level.
The paper is organized as follows. After introducing some background material, e.g., CVS, our chosen specification formalism Z, and the architectural modeling style, we present the model of the abstract system architecture.
We proceed with the model of the POSIX filesystem as an infrastructure for the implementation architecture and present the implementation architecture itself. Then we describe the refinement relation between the system architecture and the implementation architecture, and the analysis of security properties at the different layers based on formal proofs in an interactive theorem prover.
Background

The CVS operations
For the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to mention only the most common CVS commands (initiated by the client). These are: login for client authenticating, add for registering files or directories for version control, commit for transferring local changes to the repository, and update for incorporating changes from the repository (e.g., fetching the latest version from the repository) into the working copy. Additionally, CVS provides functionality for accessing the history, for branching, for logging information (which is beyond the scope of this paper), and it provides a mechanism for conflict resolution (e.g., merging the different versions), which is only modeled as an abstract operation. Further, in order to facilitate both the refinement and the security analysis, we will include in our CVS model a operation that is, strictly speaking, not part of CVS but part of the operating system: the operation modify. This operation models changes of the working copy, e.g., by editing a file.
Z and Isabelle/HOL-Z
As our specification formalism, we chose Z [16] for the following reasons: first, Z fits our modeling problem since the complex states of our components suggest using a formalism with rich theories for data structures. Second, the syntax and semantics of Z are specified in an ISO standard; 1 for future standardization efforts of operating system libraries (e.g., similar to the POSIX [17] model in Sect. 3.3.2), Z is therefore a likely candidate. Third, Z comes with a data-refinement notion [16, p. 136 ], which provides a correctness notion of the underlying "security technology mapping" between the two architectures and a means to compute the proof obligations. We assume a rough familiarity with Z (the interested reader is referred to excellent textbooks on Z such as [16, 18] ).
As our modeling and theorem-proving environment we chose Isabelle/HOL-Z [2] , an integrated documentation, type-checking, and theorem-proving environment for Z specifications built on top of Isabelle/HOL. Isabelle [9] is a generic theorem prover, i.e., new object logics can be introduced by specifying their syntax and inference rules. Isabelle/HOL is an instance of Isabelle with Church's higher-order logic (HOL) [7] , a classical logic with equality. Isabelle/HOL-Z is a conservative embedding of Z into HOL (which is semantically isomorphic to Z). As a result, Isabelle/HOL-Z combines upto-date theorem-proving technology with a widespread, standardized specification formalism and powerful documentation facilities.
Architectural modeling
As a means to identify conceptual entities of the problem domain and to structure the overall specification, we found it useful to describe the architecture of the system on several abstraction layers. Following Garlan and Shaw's approach [6, 15] , architectures are composed of components (such as clients, servers, or stores like the filesystem) and connectors (like channels, shared variables, etc). In this terminology it is straightforward to make the mentioned architectures more precise (as implementation architecture, we present the intended "open server architecture;" see Fig. 1 ). We assume for each operation (such as add) a shared variable as connector that keeps all necessary information that goes to and from the components. This paves the way to formalize this architecture by describing the transition relation of the combined system by the parallel composition of the local transition relations of the components synchronized over the corresponding shared variable. Since such transition relations can be represented in Z by operation schemas, we can thus define, for example:
where ∧ is the schema-conjunction and \ the hiding operator (i.e., an existential quantifier). Throughout this paper we will only present combined operation schemas and model properties over the transitive closure of their transition relations.
Architecture refinement
When analyzing security architectures one can separate an abstract security architecture (Sect. 3.2), which is merely a framework for describing the security requirements, from an implementation architecture (Sect. 3.3), where a mapping to security mechanisms is described (Fig. 2) . By connecting the abstract and the concrete layer formally, it is possible to reason about safety and security properties on the abstract level. Such a connection between abstract and more concrete views on a system and their semantic underpinning is well known under the term refinement, and security technology mappings can be understood as a special case of this. Various refinement notions have been proposed [11, 18] ; in our setting, we chose to use only a simple data-refinement notion following Spivey [16] .
Security models vs. security technologies
Many security models distinguish between objects (e.g., data) and subjects (e.g., users). Using role-based access control (RBAC) [13] one assigns each subject at least one role (e.g., "administrator" role), and access of objects is granted or denied by the role a subject is acting in. Further, roles can be hierarchically ordered, e.g., subjects in the "administrator" role are allowed to do everything other roles are allowed to. Our CVS-Server uses such a hierarchic RBAC model. In an RBAC model, the decision as to which roles may have access to which objects is made during system design and cannot be changed by regular users. In contrast, in a discretionary access control (DAC) model, every ob- Fig. 2 . Refining security architectures ject belongs to a specific subject (its owner ), and the owner is allowed to change the access policies at any time, hence "discretionary." For example, a DAC implementation that also allows grouping users is the Unix /POSIX filesystem layer [17] access control.
Based on a DAC that supports groups, one can "implement" an RBAC model by a special setup [12] . We use a similar technique to implement a hierarchic RBAC model for our CVS-Server on top of the POSIX filesystem layer, which is described in Sect. 3.3.3 . However, we will analyze the concrete form in which DAC is implemented in POSIX and not a conceptual model thereof.
The CVS-Server case study
The Z specification of the CVS-Server [1] consists of more than 120 pages, and the associated proof scripts are about 13 000 lines of code. The organization of the Z-sections follows directly the overall scheme presented in Fig. 3 . The Z-sections AbsState and AbsOperations describe the abstract system architecture of the client and the server components. The Z-section SysConsistency contains the consistency conditions (conservatism of axiomatic definitions, definedness of applications, nonblocking operation schemas) of the system architecture. This is mirrored at the implementation architecture level by the structures FileSystem, CVS-Server , and ImplConsistency. The Zsection Refinement contains the usual abstraction predicates relating the abstract and the concrete states, and also the proof obligations for this refinement. The security properties, together with the corresponding proof obligations, are defined in the Z-sections SysArchSec and ImplArchSec.
Entities of the security model
Following the standard RBAC model, we introduce abstract types for CVS clients (users) Cvs_Uid, permissions Permissions are hierarchically organized by the reflexive and transitive relation cvs_perm_order (over permissions Cvs_P erm) with cvs_adm as greatest element:
We turn now to the security entities and mechanisms of the CVS-Server and the clients: first we have to model the working copies and the repositories as maps assigning abstract names Abs_Name to data Abs_Data (both types are abstract in our model):
A CVS-Server provides an authorization table, which is used to control access within the repository. The server stores for each file in the repository the required permission. These tables are modeled as follows:
Clients possess in their working also a table that assigns to each abstract name a CVS client and another map that associates each CVS client to the password previously used during the CVS login procedure. The interplay of these tables will be discussed later; here we just define them:
System architecture
In this section, we give a brief overview of how we model the system architecture, which is divided into: the state of the server (including the repository), the state of the client (including the working copy), and a set of CVS operations working over both of them.
It is a distinguishing feature of a CVS-Server that it stores the authentication data inside the repository such that they can be accessed and modified with CVS operations. This implies certain formal prerequisites: we require an abstract name abs_cvsauth to be associated with data that can be converted into an authentication table via a postulated function authtab.
Modeling the server's state as a Z schema is straightforward. The state contains the repository rep and the map rep_permtab containing the required permissions for each file. Accessing the authentication table inside rep will require having the role cvs_adm. RepositoryState is modeled as follows:
The state of the client component contains the working copy wc, the wc_uidtab assigning a CVS client to each file and a password table abs_passwd with credentials (passwords) used in previous CVS login operations (abs_passwd models the file .cvspass). Thus, for any data in the working copy and whenever an access to it may be processed, an individual role may be generated and validated by the server with respect to its current repository state. Further, there is a set of abstract names wf iles that is used as filter in update and commit operations. This filter corresponds to the concept of the working directory in the implementation, i.e., the effects of these operations are restricted to files stored within the working directory:
In what follows, we define the abstract CVS operations that model combined state transitions of the client and the repository. Due to space constraints, we only present login and commit.
The login operation simply stores the authentication data on the client side. This is used to authenticate a CVS user for client permissions. The ∆ and Ξ notations are used in Z to import the schemas in two variants: one variant as a copy, the other by replacing all variables by corresponding stroked variables (e.g., wc ) describing the successor state. Ξ also introduces equalities enforcing that the components of the previous state are equal to the poststate components.
The commit (ci) operation usually takes a set of files as arguments (here denoted by files?). The case that no arguments may be passed is modeled by the possibility of setting files? to the set of all files ABS_NAME . Now we address the core of our hierarchic RBAC model of the system architecture, the has_access predicate. As a prerequisite, we define the shortcut is_valid_in for checking that a CVS client, together with a credential (password), represents a valid role with respect to the current repository:
Further, the has_access predicate ensures is_valid_in and that the permissions resulting from these credentials are sufficient to access the requested file according to the role hierarchy:
The commit operation consists of the construction of a new repository rep and a new table with required permissions rep_permtab that were constructed via the override operator ⊕ from previous states of these tables. For rep , three cases can be distinguished: (i) either a file in the repository does not occur in the working copy, in which case it is unchanged; (ii) it occurs in the working copy but not in the repository, in which case it is copied provided a valid permission is available in the wc_uid_tab of the working copy; or (iii) the file exists both in working copy and repository, in which case the working copy file overrides the repository file whenever the client has access:
The table rep_permtab is extended by permissions for files that are new in the repository (based on the permissions used for committing these files). Further, the table wc_uid_tab is updated by the add operation, which we omit here.
In addition to these abstract models of the CVS operations, we provide a modify operation that explicitly models interactions of users with their files by modifying the files of the working copy of the client state.
The implementation architecture
The implementation architecture of CVS-Server is intended to model realistically the security mechanisms used to achieve the security goals formalized in the previous system architecture. Therefore, it captures the relevant operating system environment methods, i.e., POSIX methods in our case, for accessing files and changing their access attributes. We derived our POSIX model by formalizing the specification documents [17] and detailed system descriptions [5] and by validating it by carefully chosen tests and by inspections of critical parts of the system sources. In this POSIX model, the CVS Filesystem will be embedded, i.e., a repository is described as some area in the filesystem where file attributes are set in a suitable way.
Modeling basic data structures
We declare basic abstract sorts for POSIX user IDs, group IDs, data (file contents left abstract in this model), elementary filenames, and file paths.
[U id, Gid, Data, N ame] P ath ≡ seq Name
We assume a static table groups that assigns to each user a set of groups he belongs to. We also describe a special user ID root, modeling the system administrator. As we will show later, all security goals can only be achieved for all users except root, because root is allowed to do (almost) everything.
groups: Uid → P Gid root: Uid
Modeling the POSIX filesystem access control
Within POSIX, every file belongs to a unique pair of owner (user) and group, and file access is divided into access by the user (owner), the group, or other (world). The POSIX discretionary access control (DAC) distinguishes access for reading (r), writing (w), and executing (x). We also model the "set group id" (sg) on directories, which affects the default group of newly created files within that directory (see [5] for more technical details about the Unix /POSIX DAC):
The filesystem consists of a map from a file path to file content (which is either Data for regular files or Unit for directories 2 ) and of file attributes (assigning to each file or directory the permissions, 3 the user ID of the owner, and the group it belongs to). Our concept of file attributes may easily be extended by adding new components to its records.
We use type sums for modeling the FILESYS _TAB , which are not part of the Z standard. Type sums can simulate enumerations in Z-free type definitions on the fly. The two functions Inl : X → (X + Y ) and Inr : Y → (X + Y ) are provided for building type sums.
For testing if a directory contains a specific entry (either a file or a directory), we provide the function is_in. Further, we provide functions that test for regular files (is_file_in) and for directories (is_dir_in); their definitions are straightforward:
At this point we are ready to model the filesystem state, which mainly describes the mapping of (name) paths to their attributes. As mentioned earlier, we require that all defined paths be "prefix-closed," i.e., all prefix paths must be defined in the filesystem (thus constituting a tree) and point to directories.
In addition to the filesystem state, we introduce a state schema P rocessState for client-related informa-tion, namely, the current user and group ID, the client's umask (which is used to set the initial file attributes on new files), and current working directory (wdir). The working directory is often used as an implicit parameter to filesystem and CVS operations:
As a prerequisite for describing functions that do modifications on the file system, we need to model the POSIX DAC in detail. Therefore, we first introduce a function has_attrib, which decides whether the attributes (read, write, and execute) of a file are set with respect to a specific user (and the groups he is a member of). Within this function, a crucial detail of the POSIX access model is formalized, namely, that file access is checked by sequentially testing the following conditions (leading to an overall failure if the first condition fails):
1. If the user owns the file, he can only access the file if the access attributes for users grant access. 2. If the user is a member of the group owning the file, he can only access the file if the access attributes for the group grant access. 3. Lastly, the access attributes for others are checked.
These requirements may lead to some unexpected consequences, e.g., assume a user u is a member of the group g and owner of a file with the permissions |perm == {rg, ro}, uid == u, gid == g| . Curiously, file access will be denied to him, while granted for all others in his group, because the rights specified for the user precede the rights given for the group.
Based on has_attrib we introduce shortcuts for checking read, write, and execute attributes (e.g., has_w_ attrib) of files and directories as well as definitions for checking the read, write, and execute access (e.g., has_w_access).
As an example of our approach to specifying POSIX operations, we present the (shortened) file remove specification [17] , which corresponds to unlink():
The unlink() function shall fail and shall not unlink the file if:
-A component of path does not name an existing file or path is an empty string. -Search permission is denied for a component of the path prefix, or write permission is denied on the directory containing the directory entry to be removed.
This text is formalized by a Z operation schema rm as follows: The first condition in the body is common for most filesystem operations and requires that the path of the file be a valid one in the filesystem table. The second condition requires that the client have write permissions on the file and the working directory ("the directory containing the directory entry to be removed "), which is checked via the has_w_access predicate:
The definitions for the remaining filesystem operations are similar; see [1] for details.
Mapping CVS access control onto POSIX DAC
We turn now to a crucial aspect of the implementation of the security goals by security mechanisms provided from standard POSIX DAC: any CVS role will be mapped to a particular pair of a system owner and a set of system groups. This mapping has the consequence of an inheritance mechanism for generating default roles when creating new objects in the repository. Additionally, there is a mechanism to "downscale" and "upscale" the permissions in the repository for the CVS administrator (not described here).
For every CVS operation, the server determines the CVS role according to the client's CVS ID and password. These roles are then mapped to POSIX user and group IDs, and these are compared to the file attributes of the files and directories the operations operate on. This translation is done by the two functions cvsperm2uid and cvsperm2gid.
It is important to note that CVS IDs (Cvs_Uid) are independent of POSIX IDs (Uid) and that the POSIX IDs that are used by CVS are disjoint from "normal" POSIX user IDs, i.e., it is impossible to login with such a special POSIX ID.
From these distinctness constraints it follows that the POSIX system administrator and the CVS administrator may be different. Moreover, we require that the group table (administrated by the system administrator and nobody else) be compatible with cvs_perm_order. These requirements have to be assured during installation of a CVS server.
The CVS repository is a subtree of the normal filesystem; its root is denoted by the absolute path cvs_rep, and all paths inside the repository are relative to the root cvs_rep. Further, the administrative files of CVS are stored in the CVSROOT directory, which is a subdirectory of cvs_rep, and the file that contains all authentication information is called cvsauth and is located inside CVSROOT.
Modeling the CVS filesystem
A major design decision for our specification is to enrich the F ileSystem state by new state components relevant to CVS or, more precisely, the combined client/server component of CVS. In CVS, working copies contain specific attributes assigned to the files; we restrict ourselves to security-relevant attributes, i.e., the CVS client ID and password, and the path rep where the file is located in the repository. This information is kept in a separate table implicitly associated to the working copies.
CVS _ATTR
≡ [rep : P ath; f _uid : Cvs_Uid]
CVS _ATTR_TAB ≡ P ath → + CVS _ATTR Due to space constraints, we only show some requirements of the combined POSIX and CVS filesystem:
-Working copies and the repository are distinct areas of the filesystem. -The repository contains a special directory that holds the administrative data of CVS. Certain restrictive access permissions must be ensured to this directory and its contents to preserve the system integrity. -Requirements on file attributes within the repository:
-Since the owners of files must be POSIX user IDs that are disjoint from "regular" POSIX user IDs, the group IDs must be legal with respect to the CVS role hierarchy. This guarantees that regular users only have the rights described by the file attributes for others. Thus, our initial invariant for the base directory of the repository implies that such a user cannot do anything, using only POSIX operations, within the repository. -Read, write, and execute permissions are the same for user and group. Together with our group setup this ensures that the initial CVS role and all roles with higher precedence will have the same rights to access that file.
These invariants are formally described in the axiomatic definition:
We turn now to a formal description of the repository within the filesystem. This invariant of the system is captured in the state schema Cvs_F ileSystem:
In addition to rep_attributes, we impose similar requirements for the administrative area of the repository by the predicate attr_in_root. Further, we describe in the predicate attr_outside_root the requirements for the data in the repository, i.e., files that are subject to version control. Both axiomatic definitions are omitted here.
We have now established a basis for the operations on the combined POSIX and CVS environment. As in Sect. 3.2, we present the login and commit operations in order to compare the two different architecture levels.
Before we describe the operations of the CVSServer we need to model the access to the CVS authentication table (get_auth_tab) that is part of the cvs_rep CVSROOT directory and underlies the stan- Fig. 4 . The specification of the commit command (implementation architecture) dard access discipline of CVS-Server. In particular, the authentication table is only modifiable by the CVS administrator, but not by any other client of the system. The login operation updates the variable cvs_passwd, provided that for the combination of user ID and password the authentication will succeed.
In the commit operation, the current working directory wdir can be restricted by the parameter p? to just one file or directory. All files below p? for which the client has access will be committed. We use the function cutP ath to remove a given prefix from a path.
In contrast to the system architecture specification we also must determine the POSIX file attributes of the files. The particularity of the update and the commit operation is the use of rep_access, which computes the paths into the repository to which the client has read access according to his CVS role.
The schema cvs_ci (see Fig. 4 ) models the commit command. We require that the client have read access for the file or directory in the current working directory and sufficiently high-ranking role to modify the repository.
Formal analysis
A formal model, even if successfully type-checked, is in itself not a value of its own: it must be validated, e.g., by testing techniques or by formal proof activities as in our approach. In this section, we present a formal consistency check of the specifications, and we show that the implementation architecture is, in a formal sense, a refinement of the abstract system architecture. We specify and prove security properties of the type "no combination of usercommands will enable a user to write into the repository, except if he has the required access rights."
Checking the consistency
Two types of "sanity checks" are useful and have been carried out with HOL-Z [2] routinely: -Checking definedness for all applications of partial functions in their context; undefined applications usually indicate that some part of the precondition of a schema context is missing; and -Checking the state invariant of all operation schemas; in particular, we require that in a schema, all syntactic preconditions (i.e., the conjuncts in the predicate part that contain occurrences of variables without stroke " " and " ! " suffix) suffice to show that a successor state exists. Violating these conditions results, not in logical inconsistencies, but in unprovable statements or operation definitions with undesired semantical effects.
Establishing the refinement
To prove that the concrete implementation architecture correctly implements the abstract system architecture, we have to define an abstraction schema R that relates the components of the abstract state to the components of the concrete state. In particular, we must map abstract names and data to paths and files in the sense of the POSIX filesystem, and the working copies and repositories of the abstract model must be related to certain areas of the filesystem; the authentication tables must be related, the user must not be root (the refinement simply does not work otherwise), and the file attributes in the concrete filesystem must be convertible along the mapping discussed in Sect. 3.3.3.
Due to limited space, we will only show two constraints of R formally. As a prerequisite, let us define a function Rname2path, which maps abstract names, to file paths in the implementation model. One constraint is that abs_cvsauth is mapped to the right path and the authentication tables in both models are equal:
The last constraint we present here forces the abstract working copy to have a counterpart in the implementation working copy:
Rname2path(|dom wc|) = dom wcs_attributes
To verify the refinement relation R, following Spivey in [16] , we must prove two refinement conditions for each operation on the abstract state and its corresponding operation on the concrete state: Condition (a) ensures that a concrete operation terminates whenever their corresponding abstract operation is guaranteed to terminate, and condition (b) ensures that the state after the concrete operation represents one of those abstract states in which the abstract operation could terminate.
As an example of the refinement, we show the instantiation of conditions (a) and (b) for the CVS login operation. The refinement conditions, though, as defined in [16] , assume that both operations have the same input parameters, but since we define them differently in our two models, we introduce an additional schema Asm, which is used to insert further assumptions into the refinement proofs (the effect could also have been achieved by a suitable renaming):
In the case of the login operation, these assumptions are simple since the parameters are of the same type but differ in name. Instantiating conditions (a) and (b) for the login operation and adding the assumption schema Asm The obligations for the other operations are defined analogously. So far, we have proved these obligations formally for the refinement of login, add, and update. These proofs have helped us considerably in identifying subtle side conditions in our model and thus to get our real CVS configuration "right".
Security properties in architecture layers
Specifying the security properties motivates a Z-section for the system architecture and one for the implementation architecture, both containing a classical behavioral specification. In SysArchSec we investigate security properties of the system architecture. In ImplArchSec we investigate the same properties and additional ones that are specific to the implementation architecture.
General scheme of security properties
As an interface between the operation schemas of the two architecture layers and the behavioral part allowing us to specify safety properties, we convert suitably restricted operation schemas of both system layers into explicit relations over the underlying state. The purpose of these restrictions is to provide a slot for side conditions that are related to the security model and not the functional model described in the previous sections:
where each rop i represents the operation schema op i constrained by the restriction schema R i . Further the schema disjunction step represents the overall step relation of the system, which is converted into a transitively closed relation trans:
In the literature, three types of properties can be distinguished: One may formalize properties over the set of reachable states, the set of possible transitions, or the set of possible sequences of states (traces) of a system. While the first two types are only sufficient for classical safety invariants ("something bad will never happen"), the latter two allow for the specification of liveness properties ("eventually something good will happen"). The general scheme for properties over reachable states and possible transitions for safety properties and the schema for liveness properties looks as follows:
Note that the reachable states are restricted via the existential image operator or the domain restriction to the states (respectively transitions) reachable from the set of initial states init.
An instance of the general scheme: RBAC _write
We will exemplify the scheme SP RT for a crucial security property, namely, "the user may write in the repository only if he has RBAC-permissions," which we will call RBAC _write in what follows. Moreover, we will outline the inductive proof.
As a prerequisite, we postulate two arbitrary sets knows and invents; a client "knows" a set of pairs of roles and passwords and "invents" only files from a given set of pairs from names to data. We assume invents to be closed under the merge operation left abstract in our model. 4 On this basis, we define a security policy by providing suitable restrictions rop i for the system operations. 5 For example, we restrict the add operation to elements in the domain of the invents-set, we assume login is restricted to roles, and passwords to the client knows set, the modify and add operations being restricted to data the client "invents." While these restrictions have a more technical nature, a more conceptual restriction of abs_ci is as follows: in the role cvs_adm, the authentication table may only be altered such that rights are withdrawn, not granted. A typical restriction looks as follows:
abs_loginR ≡abs_login ∧ [cvs_uid? : Cvs_Uid; passwd? :
Now we define the step-relation and its transitive closure of the system architecture layer:
AbsState ≡ ClientState ∧ RepositoryState trans ≡ {step@(θAbsState, θAbsState )} * Finally, for constructing the proof goal RBAC _write, we instantiate the P in our schema SP RT by:
This property reads as follows: whenever there is a change in the repository, and the changed file stems from the users invents-set, the user must have valid permissions according to the RBAC -model. We observe that rbac_write is true whenever the repository does not change, i.e., rbac_write(r, r, rt) holds.
A proof-outline
We will now present an exemplary proof (performed with HOL-Z) for RBAC _write. The initial proof goal stating that RBAC _write holds is refined by unfolding elementary definitions and simplification of Z notation to the following proof state:
[[σ 0 = (abs_passwd, rep, rep_permtab, wc, wc_uidtab, wf iles); σ 1 = (abs_passwd , rep , rep_permtab , wc , wc_uidtab , wfiles );
Over this implication, we can now apply an induction rule over the transitive closure:
This leads to two base cases and the induction step; both base cases are trivially true due to observation rbac_write(r, r, rt). Now it remains to show the induction steps, which after some massaging look as follows: Here, the point of proof refinement is the assumption (σ 00 , σ 01 ) : {step.(σ 0 , σ 1 )} * , which can be decomposed via the definition of step into a disjunction of schemas, where the input variables are existentially quantified. A generic tactic strips away the disjunctions and the existential quantifiers in the assumption. The result is a case split over all operations of the system architecture and universally quantified input parameters of all operations under consideration. Now, the observation is crucial that all operations except abs_ci do not change the repository and, as a consequence of observation rbac_write(r, r, rt), imply the truth of the step. We can therefore focus on the case abs_ci:
rbac_write(repx, repy, rep_permtaby); abs_ci(abs_passwdy, abs_passwdz, f ilesq, repy, repz, rep_permtaby, rep_permtabz, wcy, wcz, wc_uidtaby, wc_uidtabz, wfilesy, wfilesz)
=⇒ rbac_write(repx, repz, rep_permtabz) This is the core part of an invariance proof: the system made a transition from an initial system state (with repx) to another (with repy), performing an arbitrary combination of operations, and the system behaved well (i.e., rbac_write(repx, repy, rep_permtaby)). Now a commit operation (abs_ci) occurs, and the question is if the resulting state (with repz) will also fulfill our safety property.
The core of this subproof is, of course, a case distinction following the definition of abs_ci shown in Sect. 3.2: a file may be 1. In the repository and not in the working copy: then abs_ci will change nothing;
2. In the working copy and not in the repository: then abs_ci will only change the latter if the current credentials are is_valid_in, which implies write_correct as the rep_permtab was changed accordingly; 3. In both the working copy and the repository: then abs_ci will only change the file in the repository if the current credentials allow for has_access, which implies write_correct.
The interested reader may note that the overall scheme of the proof follows the structure of the general scheme of the property descriptions, which allows for automated tactic support that copes with Z-related technicalities, the choice of the inductions, the decomposition of the specification, and the systematic derivation of state components remaining invariant. Obviously, there is a high potential for automation for this type of proofs, such that the proof developer may be guided rather automatically to the critical questions in the induction step.
Other examples
The verification of the analogous property RBAC _read is straightforward; files in the working copy of a client are either invented by him (via the modify operation) or stem from the repository, where the client knows a password to obtain sufficient permissions. An important, but quite obvious, liveness property in the LP RT -scheme is RBAC _do_write: Provided the client has access, it can change a file arbitrarily and perform operations leaving the repository changed accordingly; the proof immediately boils down to abs_ci, which is designed to fulfill this property. At first sight, RBAC _do_write looks very similar to RBAC _write; however, note that both properties are independent: one could model an absolutely secure CVS-Server that never changes the repository. Such a model trivially fulfills RBAC _write but is ruled out by RBAC _do_write.
So far, RBAC _write is formalized for a single-user client/server setting. Extending the analysis to a multiuser client/server model requires only simple modifications in the definition of the step-relation; via renaming of the working copies and the invents and knows-sets, instances of abs_ci, abs_up, and modify for each client with individual working copy can be generated. Adding suitable restrictions (e.g., invents-and knows-sets must be pairwise disjoint), RBAC _write and similar properties remain valid.
It is well known that security properties are usually not preserved under refinement (see discussion later). The reason is that implementing one security architecture by another opens the door to new types of attacks on the implementation architecture that can be completely overlooked on the abstract level. For example, on the implementation architecture it is possible to realize an attack on the repository by combinations of POSIX commands such as rm and setumask, etc. (Sect. 3.3.2) . In principle, our method can be applied for this type of analysis of the implementation architecture as well. In this setting, the step-relation and the init-relation are defined as:
Although the proofs on the implementation architecture have the same structure as on the system architecture, they are far more complex since concepts such as paths, the distinction between files and directories, and their permissions are involved. Moreover, they require new side conditions (for example, the refinement can only be established for the case where the user is not root) that were systematically introduced by the abstraction predicate R.
On the other hand, the higher degree of detail on the implementation architecture makes a formalization of new types of security properties possible. For example, since the crucial concept directory is present on the implementation level and since the existence of files can only be established by having access to all parent directories of a file, one can express confidentiality properties such as "the user cannot find out that a file with name x exists in some directory of the repository" on this level.
Conclusion
Discussion
We demonstrate a method for analyzing the security in off-the-shelf system components made amenable to formal, machine-based analysis. The method proceeds as follows. First, specify the system architecture (as a framework for formal security properties); second, specify the implementation architecture (validated by inspecting informal specifications or testing code); third, set up the security technology mapping as a refinement; and fourth, prove refinements and security properties by mechanized proofs. The demonstration of the method follows a case study of a security problem for a real system, the CVS client/server architecture. We believe that the method is applicable for a wider range of problems such as mission-critical e-commerce applications or e-government applications.
The core of our approach is based on the presentation of the security technology mapping as data refinement problem. In general, it has been widely recognized that security properties cannot be easily refined -actually, finding refinement notions that preserve security properties is a hot research topic [8, 14] . However, standard refinement proof technology still has its value here since it checks that abstract security requirements are indeed achieved by a mapping to concrete security technology and that implicit assumptions on this implementation have been made explicit. Against implementation-specific attacks, we believe that specialized security-property-refinement techniques will be limited to restricted aspects. For this problem, in most cases the answer will be an analysis on the implementation level, possibly by reusing results from the abstract level.
In our approach, the analysis is based on interactive theorem proving while security analysis is often based on model-checking techniques for logics like LTL, the µ-calculus, or process algebras like CSP. While these techniques offer a high degree of automation, they possess well-known and obvious limitations: the state space must usually be finite and in practice be very small, and the analysis tends to be infeasible for many models, in particular those imposed by system specifications. As a consequence, proof engineers tend to develop oversimplified and unsystematically abstracted system models. In contrast, in our approach technical concerns like the size of the system state space, aesthetic concerns like naturalness of the modeling (in our example, we use architectural modeling), or methodological needs like realistic treatments of system specifications do not represent fundamental obstacles to the analysis. We expect that the need for realistic models may also enforce more general and more reusable ones such that the investment can be shared by different research groups, and such models may finally make their way into standardization processes. Moreover, we have the full flexibility of Z and HOL to express security properties at need.
Our case study shows that the presented technology and method makes the treatment of complex security problems possible. Naturally, the question arises as to how long the formalization and the proof work took. This question is hard to answer, partly because the method and technical components had been developed during the project, partly because library theorems had to be proven, and partly because some contributors needed time to learn Isabelle. The overall case study took about 18 man months, including the development of tool support. A considerable amount of time (about six man months) was spent on the formalization and testing (i.e., reverse engineering) of the system, which was done by Achim Brucker and Burkhart Wolff. The proof work was done by Frank Rittinger, Harald Hiss, and Burhart Wolff. Using our tool support, we estimate that someone with experience in theorem proving would be able to solve a similar task (specifying a similarly complex system and proving the core security properties) in less than 10 months. By improving the general technology (e.g., better frontends and tatic support) a further speedup by a factor of two seems feasible.
Related work
Sandhu and Ahn described in [12] a method for embedding role-based access control with the discretionary access control provided by standard Unix systems. Our model used this construction for providing the static roles but extended it to a dynamic model.
Wenzel developed a specification of the basic Unix functionality, which was done in Isabelle/HOL and is part of the actual Isabelle [9] distribution. On the file system part, only a simple access model, not supporting groups and the concepts of set-id bits, is formalized.
Our behavioral analysis is based on the same foundations as Paulson's inductive method for protocol verification [10] . Beyond the obvious difference that Paulson's research focus is on analysis (the language of protocols is deliberately small and restrictive) and not on modeling, technical differences consist merely in some details: Paulson uses specialized induction schemes that are automatically derived from the protocol rules; these are considered as inductive rules defining the set of system traces. In contrast, we use standard induction over transitive relations, which leads to a different organization of the specification and the security properties and leads to different tactic support.
Future work
In our opinion, amazingly little work has been devoted to the specification of the POSIX interface; due to its often not intuitive features, its importance for security implementations, and its high degree of reuse, this is a particularly rewarding area of research. We believe that our formalization is a starting point for a comprehensive, more complete model of the filesystem-related commands.
Clearly, the formal proofs established so far do not represent a complete analysis of the (real) CVS-Server. Many more security properties remain to be formulated, and, by setting up different operation restrictions R i , "best-practice" security policies can be formally investigated. Moreover, in order to make implementation-level security analysis more feasible, it could be highly rewarding to develop techniques and methods to reuse (abstract) system-level proofs on the more concrete levels.
